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We have to talk about HRQOL 
(This is a commentary on the article by Ghotra et al. (1) in this issue) 
"Happiness does not depend on outward things, but on the way we see them." Leo Tolstoy, Childhood, 
Boyhood and Youth. 
Can we ever know the mind of another? A few years ago, the Study of Participation of Children with 
Cerebral Palsy Living in Europe (SPARCLE) researchers published a seminal paper (2) on the "quality of 
life" of young people with cerebral palsy (the reason for the quotation marks will become clear). The 
unarguable message of this work was that - so long as they were free from pain – these young peoples’ 
self-assessments of their emotional well-being matched those of the general population, despite 
sometimes very severe objective impairments. In another object lesson in this paradox, the introduction 
over the last couple of decades of non-invasive ventilation for boys with Duchenne muscular dystrophy - 
which had been a highly controversial proposal seen as "prolonging wretched lives" - was supported by a 
wealth of evidence in the boys' own voices that they valued their existence and situation (3). Life 
expectancies have almost doubled since as a result of the widespread acceptance of this intervention. 
These are important lessons in the value of hearing the patient's voice. Objective (externally observable) 
assessments of a person's health can differ widely from subjective valuations of the same health state, and 
these different viewpoints can lead to very different priorities both in intervention development (what 
about my situation do I most want changed?) and measurement (what aspects of my situation should a 
meaningful health status measure reflect?). The Patient Reported Outcome revolution in health care 
research is long overdue. 
In this issue of Archives Ghotra et al. report on "health-related quality of life" (HRQOL) in children after 
paediatric arterial ischaemic stroke and show that it is lower than in healthy controls (1). The unthinking 
reader might think this is hardly surprising and turn the page, but in doing so would miss important 
underlying questions. 
If we are to make much progress in our thinking here we need to agree our concepts. There is an uneasy 
truce between two approaches to thinking about health status that whilst not incompatible do not always 
sit well together. The World Health Organisation (WHO) International Classification of Functioning (ICF) 
(4) emphasises Participation ("involvement in life situations") as a key priority of any health intervention. 
A major insight of the ICF theoretical framework is that Participation arises from important interactions 
between (i) processes located within the child (referred to under headings of Activity and Function) and 
(ii) properties of her setting or environment (in the broadest sense: not just dropped kerbs, but the 
attitudes of her classmates, the adequacy of the family benefits system, etc, etc). Even after the enormous 
effort that went into the development of the ICF there remain residual differences in views of what 
exactly is meant by Participation, but most would agree that it is (or at least includes) an objective 
(externally verifiable) assessment of involvement in society. This in turn implies shared, societal norms 
for the evaluation of that health state: a boy with autism may have low levels of participation and indeed 
prefer things that way, but from an ICF perspective his Participation is still low (5). The SPARCLE 
researchers (2) wanted to highlight how different Participation could be from a child's subjective 
(personally reported) emotional well-being. 
As Ghotra et al. rightly start their paper by stating, "a clear and thorough understanding of HRQOL…is 
especially important to guide health-improving interventions" but I've been using quotation marks 
around the "quality of life" phrase as it remains an even slipperier concept than Participation (6). 
There are at least two important, and related, areas in which instruments which all purport to measure 
“quality of life”, differ. The first – and most fundamental – is the extent to which they focus on aspects of 
an individual’s situation that are in principle observable by another. Many measures, including the 
PedsQL used by Ghotra et al. include items such as whether an individual has “problems running”. This, in 
ICF terms, is a question about Activity, verifiable by any observer. The second important area in which 
instruments differ is whether and how the salience of that problem to the individual is captured. As 
originally conceived, HRQOL's distinctive selling point is precisely that it gives the self-reported salience 
perspective ("I do have problems running, but I'm OK about that"): this is what was so valuable in the 
SPARCLE (2) and Duchenne (3) papers. Researchers are increasingly using the term "subjective well-
being" as a synonym for this particular meaning of HRQOL. But in paediatric research (and other settings 
where hearing the patient's own voice is might be anticipated to be a challenge) there is a temptation to 
seek proxy reports. What are we to make of a proxy-reported HRQOL, however well-intentioned and well-
informed the reporter might be? The purists would say that proxy-reported HRQOL is a contradiction in 
terms. Pragmatists might say that it's a valuable perspective, though perhaps it should have a different 
name to clarify its non-personal perspective. Proxy-reported "HRQOL" is generally, parent- or carer 
reported Activity and Participation. 
Some of these issues come through in Ghotra et al's findings. Where both parent and young person 
perspectives are jointly available, perspectives differ. Parents report lower overall scores and emphasise 
emotional issues; the young people report their neurological impairments, although we have little sense 
of what this means to them. It would have been interesting to have had more qualitative exploration of 
these differing perspectives, but one interpretation could be that parents are making the same error as 
those physicians caring for boys with Duchenne thirty years ago (albeit to a much lesser degree). 
Previous work by the same group (7) reported that neonatal-onset stroke was associated with poorer 
“HRQOL” than stroke occurring later in childhood. But it is worth recalling these neonatal-onset stroke 
survivors would have been eligible for Colver et al's cohort (2) (i.e. neonatal stroke is an important cause 
of cerebral palsy). Why do Ghotra et al have a gloomier view of HRQOL after neonatal stroke than Colver 
et al? The resolution of this contradiction (and others referred to in Ghotra et al’s Discussion) is likely in 
part to reflect the fact that PedsQL and KIDSCREEN (the tool used by Colver et al) are really measuring 
different constructs (KIDSCREEN is much more weighted toward “subjective well-being”) (6). It's 
tempting to hypothesise that age at onset, and particularly the extent to which acquisition of a stroke in 
later life disrupts a previously-established self-identity, lies at the heart of some of the paradoxes that 
research of this nature identifies. 
Again, Participation arises from the interactions between processes located within the child and 
properties of her context. This is important because it determines where efforts to improve Participation 
are best directed: change the child, or change her world? One slightly tongue-in-cheek conclusion that 
could be drawn from SPARCLE's work is that the most effective intervention one could propose for 
children with cerebral palsy is to move them all to northern Denmark!(8). Distinctions emphasised in the 
ICF between attributes of the child ("problems running") and attributes of her setting ("being teased at 
school") tend to be blurred in HRQOL measures such as the PedsQL . It is perhaps unsurprising that 
Ghotra et al. find socioeconomic status (SES) is an important determinant of HRQOL independent of 
intrinsic neurological impairment. Drilling down into precisely how deprivation is affecting participation 
for these children might identify important new candidate interventions. 
Finally as a neurologist and neuro-rehabilitationist I cannot let one assumption pass unremarked. The 
authors justify their twelve month assessment time point on the basis that "peak recovery" after stroke 
will have occurred within a year. Such statements can become self-fulfilling prophecies. We have shown 
important gains in gross motor function years after acquired brain injury including stroke (9), and there 
is strong evidence that we are simply not providing the rehabilitation doses required to effect meaningful 
change after acquired brain injury. Nor is it helpful to think of recovery after brain injury in children as 
progress to a stable plateau that is then maintained indefinitely: as with cerebral palsy, the effects of a 
brain injury in early life evolve over time as ongoing development interacts with a disrupted brain 
architecture (10). 
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